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Key points and Recommendations 
Macedonia is a country in deep trouble. There is a climate of mistrust between all the political parties; 
intolerance of minority groups is increasing and fear is also generated by the all-pervasive control of 
the main governing party. In 2009 the European Commission recommended that a date be set for 
accession negotiations to start, but since then the country's efforts to join the EU ( and NATO ) have 
been blocked. 
Greece has prevented the required consensus in the EU Council because it refuses to recognise the 
constitutional name of Macedonia. Yet the objective of EU (and NATO) accession is the one element 
that keeps the country united. The only way to prevent the country from sinking into further instability 
is for the accession negotiations to start without further delay. 
1.  The EU should prioritise the need for sustained political dialogue in its dealings with the 
government and in particular in the High Level Accession Dialogue.   
2.  The EU should insist that the government promote a policy of consensus and compromise with 
all the political forces, civil society and media. 
3.  The EU needs to make clear that the government’s authoritarian policies will not be tolerated. 
4.  The EU must agree on accession negotiations starting immediately. 
5.  The government must commit to an inclusive approach in the accession negotiations, similar to 
the Slovene model. 
6.  The government must commit to accepting all OSCE, Council of Europe and other 
international recommendations with regard to the electoral process and electoral code. 
7.  The government must commit to a reformed relationship with the media to ensure full respect 
for its independence, accepting all the OSCE, Council of Europe recommendations as well as 
those from all international media organisations. 
8.  The EU should cooperate more systematically with the OSCE and Council of Europe, 
particularly in areas such as the media where these organisations have expertise not readily 
available in the EU. 
9.  The EU should ensure that its cooperation with civil society organisations be more systematic, 
inclusive and form an integral part of its work, both at headquarters and in the field.  
10.  The EU, with the US, should become more directly engaged in the UN mediation process on 
the name issue to move towards a compromise solution, within a specified time limit. 
11.  EU member states should devote more effort to convincing Greece to engage in the UN 
mediation process, while encouraging the Macedonian government to be more respectful of 
democratic standards. 2 | ERWAN FOUÉRÉ 
 
Summary 
Macedonia is a country in deep trouble. 
Under a veneer of normality lies a climate of 
deep mistrust between all the political 
parties and between the main ethnic 
communities. Several incidents of 
inter-ethnic violence took place in the capital 
city earlier this year and are on the increase. 
Political dialogue, insofar as it exists 
between the parties, remains 
confrontational. 
These tensions are compounded by a climate 
of fear in the population at large, generated 
by the all-pervasive control of the main 
governing party, which has been in power 
since July 2006. This control covers not only 
the main state organs such as the judiciary 
and public administration, but also the 
electoral process and, above all, the media.  
Criticism of the government is not tolerated; 
those who dare to raise their voices are 
branded 'enemies of the state'. This includes 
civil society organisations, which have 
played an important role in monitoring the 
government's performance in implementing 
much needed reforms.  
Meanwhile, although the European 
Commission has recommended (since 2009) 
that a date be set for the start of accession 
negotiations, the country's efforts to join the 
EU (and NATO) remain blocked. 
Greece has prevented the required 
consensus in the EU Council because it 
refuses to recognise the constitutional name 
of Macedonia. 
This situation raises questions about 
Greece's commitment to stability in the 
Balkan region, ten years after the 
Thessaloniki EU-Western Balkan Summit, 
which marked a turning point in confirming 
the EU accession perspective for the 
countries of the region. 
The delay has been grist to the mill of the 
government's ethno-nationalist and populist 
agenda, and has provided a convenient 
pretext for it to pursue a number of policies 
that are at variance with the country's 
objective of EU accession. They have also 
fostered a divisive atmosphere within 
society at large - unprecedented in the 
country's history.  
Yet the objective of EU (and NATO) 
accession is, nonetheless, the one element 
that keeps the country united. The only way 
to ensure that the country does not sink into 
further instability is for the accession 
negotiations to start without further delay. 
This should be conditional on the 
establishment of an all-inclusive negotiating 
process involving the government, civil 
society, academia, the business community 
and the media. 
Background 
Macedonia submitted its candidature for EU 
membership in March 2004. It was the first 
country in the Balkan region to sign, in 2001, 
the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement; the process established by the 
EU as the first step towards gradual EU 
integration. This was the year in which the 
country witnessed an inter-ethnic armed 
conflict, which was brought to an end by the 
signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
in August 2001, brokered by the EU, the US, 
NATO and the OSCE. 
The EU Council granted Macedonia 
candidate status in December 2005, based on 
the positive Opinion from the European 
Commission on the country's application. In 
October 2009, the EC recommended that a 
date be set for the opening of negotiations. 
The EU Council has not yet endorsed this 
recommendation. 
The current Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, 
leader of the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organisation-Democratic 
Party for Macedonian National Unity 
(VMRO-DPMNE), was elected in the 
Parliamentary elections of July 2006. He was MACEDONIA - A COUNTRY IN CRISIS | 3 
 
re-elected in the June 2008 elections, and 
again in the 2011 elections. 
His coalition partner, since 2008, 
representing the ethnic Albanian community 
is Ali Ahmeti, leader of the Democratic 
Union for Integration (DUI), a party that 
emerged after the 2001 conflict. 
According to the 2002 census, the ethnic 
Albanian community represents 25% of the 
total population of two million.  
The main opposition party, the Social 
Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), is 
led by Zoran Zaev, Mayor of Strumica. 
General political situation 
In the European Commission's Progress 
Report of 10 October 2012, it was stated that 
''Overall the functioning of the Parliament 
and political dialogue have been 
maintained.” 
Just over two months later, on December 
24th, the parliamentary proceedings erupted 
in violence with the forcible eviction from 
the Parliament Chamber – not only of all the 
journalists but also of the opposition MPs. 
It was the opposition's efforts to remove 
what it perceived as unproductive 
expenditure (largely related to the vast and 
controversial "Skopje 2014" Urban Renewal 
Project) from the draft annual budget that 
prompted these events. The governing party 
forced a vote in plenary on the budget before 
the parliamentary committee procedure had 
been completed. 
For many observers, the forcible eviction 
from Parliament of the opposition parties 
crossed a red line. It reinforced serious 
concerns over the government's 
commitment to upholding the basic 
democratic standards expected of any 
country aspiring to join the EU. 
Unfortunately, rather than attempt to repair 
the damage, the government pushed 
through a change to the parliamentary rules 
of procedure to limit debate, despite the 
absence of the opposition parties (which 
were boycotting Parliament following their 
eviction).  
The inexplicably feeble reaction from the EU 
to the events of December 24th, even 
allowing for the Christmas break, no doubt 
contributed to the governing party's sense of 
impunity in pursuing its policy of no 
compromise. 
Faced with the danger of the March local 
elections being boycotted by the opposition 
parties, Commissioner Štefan Füle, 
accompanied by the European Parliament 
Rapporteur, Mr. Howitt and former EP 
President Mr. Buzek (a member of the 
European Peoples Party to which 
VMRO-DPMNE has observer status), 
undertook an eleventh-hour mediation 
effort on 1st March. 
The agreement reached after hours of 
laboured discussions offered a temporary 
reprieve. It enabled the opposition to end its 
boycott and participate in the local elections, 
in return for a commitment from the 
government to establish a Committee of 
Inquiry into the events of December 24th 
and the drawing up of a consensus 
document whereby all the political parties 
would reaffirm their commitment to the 
objective of EU accession. 
It took over three months for the Committee 
of Inquiry to be set up under an agreed 
chairman, with its first meeting taking place 
in June. One month later the chairman 
resigned – frustrated at the refusal of both 
sides to agree on joint conclusions. 
With the European Commission's next 
Progress Report due soon, the Committee 
reconvened on August 20th in the presence 
of the prime minister and the leader of the 
opposition. A final report was signed by all 
Committee members on August 26th, 
containing both legal interpretations over 
the breach of the Constitution by the forcible 
expulsion of the opposition MPs and 4 | ERWAN FOUÉRÉ 
 
journalists in December, as well as 10 
recommendations relating to the 
improvement of parliamentary rules and 
parliamentary security. However, after the 
signing, the VMRO-DPMNE Committee 
members rejected the legal interpretations 
contained in the report. This raises serious 
questions about the effective follow-up of 
the Committee's report. 
These developments are a reflection of the 
inability to find common political ground at 
a critical time in the country's history. It 
prompted Commissioner Füle in an April 
interview to question "the strength of the 
democratic institutions in the country" – his 
strongest public message yet on the 
situation. 
The failure of the Gruevski-led government 
to engage in any meaningful political 
dialogue over the years has been a 
continuing weakness. It is unfortunate that 
the European Commission's 2012 Progress 
Report made only passing reference to the 
need for enhanced political dialogue. Yet in 
previous years, for example in the 2009 
Progress Report that included a 
recommendation that a date be set for 
opening accession negotiations, the issue of 
political dialogue was given much greater 
prominence, and always referred to as a key 
priority. As the events of last December 
illustrate, the lack of dialogue within the 
political and institutional system remains an 
issue in the country. 
It is thus vital that in its dealings with the 
government and with the ongoing High 
Level Accession Dialogue, the European 
Commission prioritise the issue of 
sustained political dialogue.   
Political discourse, insofar as it existed over 
the past eight years, has been dominated by 
bitter personal rivalry between the prime 
minister and the former president and 
opposition leader, Branko Crvenkovski. 
Crvenkovski was elected president in 2004 
following the untimely death of the 
incumbent Boris Trajkovski, in an election 
whose results were never accepted by the 
VMRO-DPMNE, despite a convincing 
margin of votes.  
During Crevenkovski's mandate as 
president, Gruevski never acknowledged his 
title as president and repeatedly boycotted 
his annual parliamentary address. At the 
end of his five-year mandate in 2009, 
Crvenkovski assumed the leadership of the 
opposition SDSM party up until June of this 
year. 
Although a new leader has been elected, the 
rivalry continues with the governing party 
using the same confrontational tone towards 
the opposition – hardly worthy of a mature 
democracy. 
Even if the opposition manages to reinvent 
itself as a viable opposition party, or even if 
a new independent party, unshackled from 
the country’s former bad habits and 
representing a new more modern and 
democratic image were to emerge in future 
elections, the odds are heavily stacked 
against it. All the main state organs, in 
particular the judiciary and public 
administration, not to mention the electoral 
process, are under the control of the current 
government. The same goes for the media 
(see below).  
To quote the OSCE/ODIHR election 
observation report on the 2013 local 
elections: "Partisan media coverage and a 
blurring of state and party activities did not 
provide a level playing field for candidates". 
The Report also states that: "Allegations of 
voter intimidation persisted throughout the 
elections and several cases of apparent 
misuse of state resources for campaign 
purposes. This raised concerns about voter 
ability to cast their vote free of fear and 
retribution". 
Another aspect that has marred the political 
atmosphere is the deepening mistrust 
between the Macedonian and ethnic 
Albanian communities. Although support 
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government policy (as well as a requirement 
for its EU accession) many of the policies 
pursued by the party, such as the Skopje 
2014 project, reflect a lack of sensitivity for 
the multi-ethnic character of the country. 
Instead of promoting a policy of unity, the 
governing party's behaviour is 
jeopdardising the delicate balance that has 
so far kept the country together.  
This confrontational political atmosphere 
has also affected relations within the 
coalition government between the 
VMRO-DPMNE and the main ethnic 
Albanian party DUI, in coalition since the 
elections of 2008. Born out of necessity 
because of the number of parliamentary 
votes required to obtain the double majority, 
an obligation for those laws relating to 
constitutional and inter-ethnic issues, the 
current coalition has all the markings of a 
'marriage of convenience' that manages to 
contain the deep mistrust between the ethnic 
communities. At the same time, continued 
delays in the start of accession negotiations 
and in resolving the name dispute with 
Greece are likely to increase tensions within 
the coalition - already sorely tested by 
several of the governing party's ethnocentric 
policies. 
Any change in the current coalition is 
unlikely, however. Leaving aside the 
lucrative business interests at stake for the 
coalition parties, the option of DUI leaving 
the coalition at this stage would only trigger 
early elections. In the current political 
climate and flawed electoral process, early 
elections would resolve nothing, and would 
further delay much needed reforms.  
The inter-ethnic tensions have also taken on 
increasingly religious overtones, with the 
governing party's extensive church-building 
campaign inciting the ethnic Albanian 
(predominantly Muslim) community to do 
the same with mosque building. 
Furthermore, the governing party has not 
hesitated to exploit religion to gain votes and 
push through its socially conservative 
agenda. A new and restrictive abortion law 
was adopted in Parliament earlier this year 
with little public debate or consultation with 
civil society organisations. That it was 
pushed through Parliament in a fast-track 
procedure often used with many other 
controversial laws in past years says much 
about the governing party's attitude to 
parliamentary democracy. 
Meanwhile, despite repeated entreaties from 
the European Commission, and after an 
acrimonious debate, an anti-discrimination 
law was adopted in 2010, but with the 
exclusion of sexual orientation as a basis for 
discrimination, thus making it incompatible 
with EU legislation; the only country in the 
Balkans to do so. According to the 2012 
report from the Macedonian Helsinki 
Committee, and confirmed in last year's EC 
Progress Report, the functioning of the 
Commission for Protection against 
Discrimination, set up to oversee 
implementation of the law, remains ''weak 
and under resourced'', and its 
recommendations not followed up by state 
institutions. 
The governing party's intention to introduce 
a constitutional amendment to have 
marriage defined as a union between a man 
and a woman is sure to add to prejudice and 
divisions in society. 
The selective approach and double 
standards in the application of the rule of 
law, as well as using the pressure of tax 
inspections in order to neutralise those 
regarded as political opponents, have 
increased the climate of fear, intolerance and 
aggression in a society that used to be 
known for the very opposite.  
On each occasion, arrests are made in full 
glare of the media – who have been alerted 
beforehand. Even if charges are eventually 
dropped, the element of wrong-doing 
remains in the minds of the public, which is 
what the government intended all along.  6 | ERWAN FOUÉRÉ 
 
Meanwhile, both the Centre for Civic 
Communications and the Macedonian 
Centre for European Training are two of the 
many civil society organisations whose work 
has been the subject of vitriolic attacks by 
senior governing party ministers. Their ‘sin’ 
was to present factual reports questioning 
the government's reform record, in 
particular regarding public procurement 
practices and mismanagement of EU funds.  
In this respect, the EU needs to be more 
systematic in offering inclusive support to 
civil society organisations, including those 
attacked by the government to ensure that 
the government undertakes regular 
consultations with all civil society 
organisations without discrimination. 
The climate of fear and intolerance is also 
encouraged by government-supported 
media outlets, with anti-Albanian and 
homophobic sentiments and hate speech not 
unusual in popular talk shows.  
Another subject causing deep resentment in 
society at large has been the abuse by the 
government of the so-called Lustration 
process. Established to identify those proved 
to have collaborated with the intelligence 
services during the Communist era so as to 
exclude them from public office, the process 
has turned into a witch hunt against those 
critical of the government. The government 
has ignored the repeated Constitutional 
Court's rulings on the Lustration law. The 
2012 US State Department country report on 
human rights practices states that the 
government has used the Lustration 
Committee "as a means of attacking political 
opponents and disloyal former associates". 
Even dead people have been named. One of 
Macedonia's best known writers Slavko 
Janevski, founder of the Macedonia 
Academy of Sciences and Arts, who died in 
2000, was one of those named, on very 
dubious grounds which has made the whole 
process even more discredited.  
It is vital that the government be made to 
understand that controlling all the main 
sources of power and authority brings with 
it an enhanced responsibility to reach out 
to all political parties and civil society in a 
spirit of compromise and consensus.   
The EU also needs to be more forceful in its 
messages to warn the government of the 
negative consequences of its authoritarian 
policies. 
State of the reforms 
The EC's Progress Report of 2012 deemed 
that the ''political criteria continue to be 
sufficiently met'', and has reiterated in four 
consecutive reports its recommendation that 
a date be set for opening negotiations. 
At the same time, even allowing for the 
successive action plans adopted as a 
follow-up to the Progress Reports, the latest 
EC report paints a less than satisfying 
picture, both as regards the quality of the 
reforms and their implementation. It 
highlights numerous critical reform areas 
where the country has not only fallen 
behind, it has in fact slipped backwards. 
For example, it states that ''little progress 
was made as regards the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary". Despite 
repeated promises over the past four years, 
the government has still not established a 
process of incorporating all the graduates 
from the EU funded Academy of Judges and 
Public Prosecutors into the judicial system, 
preferring government supported 
candidates. With the many instances of 
political interference in the judicial process, 
the governing party's repeated criticisms of 
the Constitutional Court, its insistence that 
judges be assessed by the number of cases 
they process rather than by the quality of 
their work the question arises of whether the 
government is really interested in ensuring 
the independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary; a point highlighted in the EC 
Progress Report. 
According to the same Progress Report, 
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and continues to be a serious problem''. One 
of those relates to public procurement, a 
very lucrative market with the government's 
intensive capital investment programmes 
linked to Skopje 2014. The 2012 US State 
Department Report mentioned above also 
points to the disregard by the government to 
the right of public access to information, 
''especially with regard to citizen's access to 
the government's financial and public 
procurement dealings''.  
The governing party, meanwhile, continues 
to question these findings and diverts 
attention onto the name issue as being the 
only problem facing the country.  
The only way to ensure real reforms that 
will bring benefits to the country rather 
than the mere declarative statements or 
legislation adopted with no follow-up, is 
for accession negotiations to start 
immediately.  
The very intrusive nature of the accession 
process, with its detailed and intensively 
technical interaction between the EU 
institutions and all the state bodies, as well 
as minute controlling of each area under 
scrutiny in the acceding country is the best 
way of ensuring that the reform process 
remains on track.  
Critical for success, however, will be the 
inclusiveness of the process, i.e. ensuring 
that the negotiating process on the 
Macedonian side incorporates not only 
government, but also civil society, 
academia, business community and the 
media. This inclusive process ensures 
greater confidence for citizens that the 
rewards are worth the effort involved. 
Slovenia’s experience of the accession 
process is a telling example here, which has 
often been presented to the government, 
but sadly without follow up. 
The name issue 
When Macedonia gained independence in 
1991, Greece, in an action more reminiscent 
of a Balkan past that everyone hoped 
forgotten, launched a campaign against the 
country because of the name it had adopted, 
imposing an economic boycott that caused 
much damage to Macedonia's fragile 
economy. A UN- brokered Interim Accord 
was signed between both sides in September 
1995, which provided for Greece to lift its 
embargo and recognise Macedonia under its 
provisional name of ''Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia'', in return for 
Macedonia agreeing to change its flag and 
reaffirm that nothing in its constitution 
could be interpreted as laying any claim to 
Greek territory. The Accord also included a 
commitment from Greece that it would not 
block Macedonia's membership under this 
provisional name of any regional or 
international organisation. A UN mediation 
process was set up under a new mediator 
Matthew Nimetz, who continues to this day 
in the same role (with the patience of an 
archangel!).  
Despite this commitment, both at the NATO 
Summit in Bucharest in 2008 and 
subsequently at the EU Council in December 
2009, Greece refused to join the consensus 
required for the Macedonian accession 
process. The case which Macedonia 
successfully brought before the International 
Court of Justice, alleging that Greece had 
violated the 1995 Interim Agreement, 
brought Macedonia a moral victory but 
unfortunately did nothing to change the 
Greek position. 
What motivates Greece to pursue this 
decidedly non-European policy, which also 
involves Bulgaria, but to a lesser extent? 
It has much to do with the nature of politics 
in the Balkans, a region often said to have 
produced more history than it can absorb. 
The conflicting dreams and interpretations 
of the Balkan past, with Macedonia's 
neighbours laying claim to past heroes, 
whether it is Alexander the Great (whom 
Greeks claim to be part of Hellenic heritage) 
or Goce Delcev, immortalised as a 8 | ERWAN FOUÉRÉ 
 
Macedonian hero in its national anthem, but 
claimed by Bulgarians as part of their 
heritage, have all added to a potent mix of 
nationalism and wounded pride. Greece has 
also laboured under a succession of weak 
governments, unwilling to move beyond 
parochial politics. 
The tragedy of this impasse is that not only 
is it delaying EU accession prospects for 
Macedonia, it is also fuelling the 
deep-rooted nationalist agenda and 
authoritarian rule of a governing party that 
is presented as the sole defender of the 
identity and dignity of Macedonia. 
The issue of identity is an emotive one at the 
best of times; all the more so for a country 
like Macedonia that has had neighbouring 
countries laying claim to its language and its 
history, or refusing to recognise the 
autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox 
Church (as is the case today with the refusal 
of both the Serbian and Greek Orthodox 
Churches).  
However, in promoting a policy of 
ethno-nationalism, which did so much 
damage in the Balkans as recently as during 
the Milosevic era, the main governing party 
has embarked on a controversial policy of 
giving citizens a false sense of identity while 
fomenting dangerous undercurrents that 
upset the delicate inter-ethnic co-existence.  
Starting with renaming the airport as 
''Alexander the Great'' airport in 2007, well 
before the Bucharest NATO Summit, the 
government continued with renaming the 
main north-south highway as ''Alexander of 
Macedon'', in the process losing 50 million 
euros of Greek financing for the European 
Transport corridor of which the highway 
was a part. This was followed by the official 
launch in 2010 of the biggest monument and 
statue-building project ever seen in the 
entire Balkan region - the Skopje 2014 
project. Three years on, Macedonia's capital 
city is replete with statues glorifying 
Alexander the Great, as well as his father 
(Philip 11) and mother (Olympia). The 
project includes a triumphal arch, museums, 
lions, fountains and countless statues (the 
new Foreign Ministry facade is adorned 
with more than 30 statues).  
Up until April, the government had refused 
to reveal any details of the costs involved. In 
its first report on the matter in early April, it 
stated that 208 million euros had already 
been spent, including 10.5 million for the 
Alexander the Great statue alone. However, 
most estimates suggest that the expenditure 
of Skopje 2014 exceeds the half-billion euros. 
For a country with an unemployment rate of 
over 30%, including one of the highest youth 
unemployment rates in the world, plus over 
30% living below the poverty line (South 
East Europe Regular Ecomonic Report, June 
2013,World Bank), the cost of this vast 
building project is viewed by many as an 
extravagance the country can ill afford. 
What has greatly angered the inhabitants of 
the capital city is the lack of any 
comprehensive public consultation, which 
would have been a normal procedure in any 
western European country.  
The impact of this project on the name issue 
and on relations between both Greece and 
Bulgaria has been predictable: both 
countries, in particular Greece, view these 
actions as not only an offensive 
appropriation of their history, but also an 
unnecessary provocation. To quote the 
Economist's irreverent turn of phrase in an 
article reporting on the erection of a 
25-metre statue of Alexander the Great in the 
city square in 2011, ''the government is now 
about to erect what amounts to a giant 
bronze middle finger aimed at Greece" 
(Economist, 26 July 2011). Little wonder then 
that relations between Macedonia and 
Greece have not been so strained at any time 
in the 22 years since Macedonia's 
independence.  
Various attempts have been made at 
breaking the deadlock, with both the EU and 
the US encouraging renewed momentum 
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Unfortunately, the glimmer of hope for some 
breakthrough that arose during the 
premiership of George Papandreu (2009-11) 
has long gone, with the current government 
of PM Samaras showing no inclination to 
engage.  
With Bulgaria, even if tensions still exist, 
there is at least an ongoing dialogue of sorts, 
with both prime ministers having met at the 
end of July. 
With Greece assuming the presidency of the 
EU in January 2014, the EU should insist that 
Greece use the opportunity to resolve this 
dispute once and for all, before it spirals out 
of control. Similarly, EU member states, 
some of whom are quick to praise Gruevski 
for the country's reforms - thus giving false 
hopes and even legitimacy to the 
authoritarian policies of the government, 
should focus their energies on convincing 
Greece to allow negotiations to start. 
There is no doubt, however, that the 
combination of the EU's soft power, together 
with the weight of the US authority in the 
Balkans, is necessary to have the greatest 
impact in the UN mediation process. The 
experience from the 2001 conflict and the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement, as well as the 
border demarcation negotiations between 
Macedonia and Kosovo in 2009, where both 
the EU and the US together played a decisive 
role, shows that the EU/US tandem is the 
most effective way of achieving a successful 
outcome. 
Meanwhile, both the Prime Minister and 
President Ivanov continue to insist that the 
country is willing to find a compromise that 
respects the identity and dignity of 
Macedonia. The Prime Minister has also 
reiterated that whatever compromise is 
agreed, it would be for the citizens to decide 
in a referendum.  
At the same time, however, the government 
has done nothing to prepare public opinion 
for a possible agreement. On the contrary, 
Gruevski has actively discouraged any 
discussion - whether in Parliament or in the 
public. He has even castigated those who 
tried to generate such a debate as 'traitors'. 
Encouraging an open debate within the 
country will thus be a critical aspect of 
ensuring public acceptance of a compromise 
solution. It will also be the only way in 
which to reassure the population that, as the 
UN mediator himself has stated, the 
negotiations relate to the name of the 
country alone and do not affect its identity 
or language, for example. 
Ironically, the Prime Minister is probably the 
only politician in Macedonia at the moment 
w h o  c o u l d ,  i f  h e  s o  c h o s e ,  f i n d  ‘ T h e  W a y  
Out'' (to use the title of his Master's Thesis 
published in 2008) in reaching a compromise 
with Greece and bringing the population 
along with him.  
The question is: Will he take that step 
together with Greece? Will he join hands 
with Prime Minister Samaras and follow the 
example of Alexander the Great, the hero 
they each venerate as their own, and 
together break the 'Gordian knot'?   
There is no doubt that the only way out of 
the current impasse is for the EU, together 
with the US, to engage directly with both 
the Greek and Macedonian governments to 
complement the UN mediation process.  
For any chance of final agreement, a time 
frame would have to be imposed on the 
negotiation process, similar to what 
occurred in the Northern Ireland peace 
process.  
Government control of the media 
"I invite you to spend one week in the 
country and watch television so that you can 
personally witness the freedom that the 
media enjoy".  
With this statement, made publicly in front 
of European Commission President Barroso 
during the latter's visit in 2011, Gruevski 
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government's control over the media. By the 
time that statement was made, the country 
had slipped dramatically in the media 
freedom index. The most popular TV station, 
AI, known for its independent stance critical 
of the government, was forced off the air 
with the company's assets frozen by the 
Public Revenue Office over alleged 
non-payment of taxes and its owners 
imprisoned. Several newspapers, known for 
their views independent of government, 
were also forced to close. 
Since then the situation has deteriorated 
even further. According to the latest world 
media freedom index, published in January 
by Reporters without Borders, Macedonia 
was ranked 116th out of 179 countries, a 
drop of 22 places from 2012, and over 80 
places from 2009, when it was ranked in 34th 
place. (The comparable figures for Serbia are 
65th place in 2009 and 63rd place in 2013). 
The report points to the decline as a 
''consequence of the arbitrary withdrawal of 
media licenses, deterioration in the 
environment for journalists, judicial 
harassment based on often inappropriate 
legislation, lack of access to public data, 
physical and psychological violence against 
employees in the news sector, as well as 
official and private advertising being used as 
a tool". 
The OSCE/ODIHR report of this year's local 
elections stated that "Since the last elections, 
the closure of two broadcasters and a 
number of print media outlets significantly 
reduced the number of media outlets critical 
of the government. In addition, the 
government is the largest single advertiser in 
the country". It quotes from the AGBNielsen 
Audience Measurement, which calculated 
that in 2012 alone, government-affiliated 
bodies spent 25 million euros in advertising 
in the media, thus giving the government 
unparalleled control over media outlets. 
The UN Rapporteur for freedom of speech 
who visited the country in June, referred to 
''an atmosphere of intimidation towards any 
kind of critical press that questions, 
investigates or criticises government". He 
went on to underline that "media should be 
able to work in an environment free from 
intimidation and fear".  
The Balkan Insight (BIRN) in a media 
analysis published on the occasion of the 
EC's June 2013 conference on the media 
situation in candidate countries stated in 
referring to Macedonia that ''media outlets 
have been closed, professional journalists 
with long experience are prevented from 
working and the pile of law suits against 
journalists grows higher". 
The arrest on May 29th of a Macedonian 
journalist over an article published in 2008 
naming a protected witness in a murder case 
has added to the atmosphere of 
intimidation. His continued detention for a 
third month has been roundly condemned 
by all international media organisations, as 
well as by the OSCE Freedom of the Media 
Representative who stated: "it is 
unacceptable that a journalist is detained for 
his reporting." While the case also highlights 
the continued practice of abuse by the 
government of preventative detention, the 
timing of his arrest has raised concerns 
about political interference. It came just 
three days after he had published an article 
pointing to suspicious circumstances 
surrounding the death in a car crash in late 
March of a respected journalist known for 
his independent views.  
A law decriminalising defamation adopted 
in 2012 was welcomed by the EU. However, 
for most of the journalists and media in the 
country, it was more of a cosmetic gesture 
that does little to improve the overall 
atmosphere and governing party attitude 
towards media independence. 
The latest development relates to the 
proposed legislation that would establish a 
regulatory agency for print, online and 
audio visual media. For many independent 
observers this would be another form of 
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government is claiming it is a measure 
promoted by the EC, a claim disputed by the 
latter. Both the OSCE and Council of Europe 
experts have made suggestions, all of which 
have yet to be fully incorporated in the draft 
law currently before the Parliament.  
The fear is that, as in other cases, the 
government will push through the draft 
before all comments have been incorporated 
or consultations completed, but in time for it 
to be mentioned in this autumn's EC 
Progress Report, to be published on 16 
October.  
The same Balkan Insight – BIRN media 
analysis mentioned above also pointed to 
the general disappointment of journalists in 
Macedonia with the weak EU stance on the 
media situation. One of the journalists 
present at the EC conference, representing 
the Macedonian Media Development 
Centre, is quoted as saying ''journalists have 
become victims of the political games played 
between Brussels and the Macedonian 
government". 
While it is true that the EU acquis in this area 
is limited, because of the nature of politics in 
the Balkan region with political interference 
and corruption existing at the highest levels, 
there are sufficient arguments to justify the 
EU taking a much more proactive role. This 
should be along the lines suggested in the 
European Policy Centre issue Paper of 
November 2011, whereby the EU should 
develop a "more inclusive strategy in 
assisting the fight for media freedom, one 
that can target the corruption element, the 
implementation of the legal framework, the 
need to foster a democratic culture'', as well 
as to “educate and financially support 
aspiring journalists'', and investigative 
journalism.  
With different messages coming from the 
EC, OSCE, etc., it is vital that the EC take a 
more hands-on approach to monitoring the 
situation on the ground. It should thus 
coordinate its approach with the OSCE, 
Council of Europe and the International 
Federation of Journalists and other media 
watchdogs to ensure a unified approach 
vis-à-vis the media situation in Macedonia, 
to avoid the government trying to play one 
against the other. 
Conclusion 
Up until 2005, when it was granted 
candidate status, Macedonia was regarded 
as a success story, moving forward on all the 
steps required towards its objective of EU 
integration. Today, it is at the bottom of the 
list of countries aspiring to join. The last 
European Council in June didn't even 
mention the country in its conclusions on 
developments in the Balkans. 
Not all the blame for the parlous situation in 
which the country finds itself can be put on 
the name dispute with Greece, despite the 
government's contention. There are serious 
and deep-rooted problems inherent in the 
governance of the country and in the 
authoritarian methods of the government. 
Their impact on society and on inter-ethnic 
relations should not be underestimated. The 
longer this situation continues, the greater 
the danger it creates for the stability of the 
country.  
Urgent measures are therefore required, 
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